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We explain an inﬂuence of voters’ preferences on the stable parliament seat
share. Under proportional representation, we have the possibility of lock-in into
one of alternative political party or, conversely, the feasibility of their long term
co-existence. If most voters have strong support for the particular party, the
long term co-existence is realized easily. If most voters pay attention to political
eﬀectiveness, the lock-in into one of political party is easy to occur. A dominant
party is decided depending on early historical event.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we show that the dynamics of a parliament seat share using an adoptive
process modeled by urn scheme. In particular, we clarify the condition under which one
dominant party or co-existence arises, when voters recognize the political eﬀectiveness
as important.
One of the important factors for voters to decide their voting is how a political
party’s proposal is close to their ideals, which reﬂect their religion, social class, age
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1and so on. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967) shows, in Europe structural conﬂicts of in-
terests in the society (centre-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and owner-worker)
are important fact to construct a party support. In 1950’s Britain, for example, the
Conservative Party was mainly the party of southern Britain and of the Church of Eng-
land; the Liberals had much greater strength in the peripheries and among religious
Nonconformists.
There exists another important factor to choose a party. In the literature it is
often supposed that the winning party has the power to implement any proposal with
probability 1. However, voters have room to consider the likelihood that a party will
implement its proposal, i.e., the political eﬀectiveness. A society is formed by voters
who have diﬀerent ideals. Some of them may be more in favor of the policy that
was announced by the defeated party; others, on the contrary, may be in favor of
the winning party’s proposal. The actions taken by the government are inﬂuenced
by voters. The inﬂuence of voters in favor of a proposal will become bigger if the
proportion of seats obtained by the corresponding party. Clearly a party winning 51%
of the seats will have more diﬃculty to carry out its proposal than one winning 80%
of the seats. As shown in Duverger(1967), voters for small parties will see that their
vote is being ‘wasted’ and they will switch to supporting a major party.
We consider the case where voters pay attention to two points to choose a party;
the closeness between a party’s ideology and their ideals, and the political eﬀectiveness.
Here, we consider the simple society where there are two parties, say, A and B, and
three type voters, say, a, b, and c. Voter a receives positive beneﬁts from A and
negative one from B. She always votes for party A tough A has any low seat share.
Conversely, voter b obtains negative beneﬁts from A and positive one from B. He votes
for party B irrespective of the seat share of B. Voter c gets the same beneﬁts from
both parties. Party A and B are indiﬀerent for voter c. Voter c votes for a party with
higher seat share. Voter a and b count the closeness to a party strongly and they ignore
the political eﬀectiveness. Voter a has the low critical seat share to vote for party A
2and voter b has the high critical seat share to vote for A. Voter c pays attention to the
political eﬀectiveness. He has the moderate critical seat share to vote for party A. We
regard a voter’s critical seat share as his preference. For purposes of comparison we
consider two shapes of distribution of voters’ preferences, bimodal and single-peaked.
If voters’ preferences are distributed as bimodal, each party has strong supporters
who always vote for the support party and the proportion of voters who care the polit-
ical eﬀectiveness as important is small. As each party has strong supports potentially
even if it leaves what initial state, in progress of time, two seat shares become equiva-
lent, i.e., the long term co-existence is realized in the equilibrium. Conversely, if voters’
preferences are distributed as single-peaked, most voters are interested in the political
eﬀectiveness. Then, a party with higher seat share is more attractive for voters and it
gains an even higher seat share. After all, a party with a high initial seat share comes
into power, i.e., the lock-in into one of political party is realized.
The dynamics treated in this paper is the generalized urn process discussed in Hill et
al. (1980), Arthur et al. (1983), and Dosi et al.(1994). As Dosi et al.(1994) mentioned,
by specifying the function which characterizes an agent’s behavior, it is possible to
analyze the stochastic evolution of the share. We deﬁne the voters’ behavioral patterns
and demonstrate how the global forces ruling the dynamics of whole populations can
be derived from the individual behavior of voters.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 set up the model.
Some results on the stable seat share in parliament are presented in Section 3. Section
4 concludes and proposes some issues for a further research.
2 The Model
We consider an inﬂuence of voters’ Preferences on the stable parliamentary seat share
under the proportional representation where there are two political parties, A and B,
and contest a seat in the election. At each period t = 1,2,···, only one voter chosen
3randomly can obtain the voting opportunity. He votes for A or for B, without the
possibility of abstention.
If A(B) implements its proposal, voter j gets beneﬁts aj(bj) from the closeness
between A(B)’s ideology and jfs ideal. Is it the best choice for voter j to vote for A, if
aj > bj? Of course, since he is imperfectly informed about the possibility of enforcement
of a proposal, he uses some bounded rational decision rule to make his choice. Party
A may be a new and unknown party with a small political power to implement its
policies and party B may be a well-known one with a ﬁrm political power. Hence,
potential voters perceive a diﬀerent risk in this choice and require diﬀerent evidence.
Voters know that a political party with a low seat share will have more diﬃculty to
implement its proposal than one with a high seat share. We call the likelihood that a
party implements its proposal as the political eﬀectiveness. The political eﬀectiveness
is one of the important eﬀects for voters to choose a party. We assume that the
political eﬀectiveness is an increasing function of seat share as in Stigler(1972). For
simpliﬁcation, we regard the seat share as the likelihood that the corresponding party
will realize its proposal.
We assume that voters pay attention to two points to choose a party; the closeness
between party’s ideology and own ideal, and the political eﬀectiveness. When party
A has seat share X, voter j gains an expected beneﬁts Xaj from party A and gains
(1 − X)bj from B. Voter j has a critical seat share at which he obtains the same
expected beneﬁts from party A and B. For each voter j, we can deﬁne such a critical
seat share J = bj(aj + bj)−1, which represents his preference.
We assume that aj + bj > 0 1. This assumption avoids a situation where voters
obtain negative beneﬁts from both parties. If a voter gets just negative beneﬁts from
both parties, it is natural for her to abstain from voting. The assumption aj +bj > 0 is
consistent with no abstention. However, this assumption does not avoid the situation
1We can have the analogous analysis if aj + bj < 0. In this case, voter j votes for party A if party
A’s seat share is smaller than j’s critical seat share.
4that a voter gets positive beneﬁts from a party but she gets negative beneﬁts from
another party.
We assume that aj and bj distribute over [−∞,∞], and J distributes over [−∞,∞].
A voter votes for party A, if A has a higher seat share than his critical seat share,
conversely a voter votes for party B, if A has a lower seat share than her critical seat
share. Hence, a voter whose critical seat share is less than zero vote for A regardless
of A’s seat share, and a voter whose critical seat share is more than one vote for
B regardless of B’s seat share. They have a favorable party. Voters whose critical
seat share is 0.5 vote for a party getting the higher seat share. These voters care the
political eﬀectiveness rather than the favor to a party. They dislike getting smaller
beneﬁts rather than enduring not to support a favorable party. They prefer to behave
strategically.
The two political parties have already got parliamentary seats, say, nA and nB at
period 0. We shall denote a realized party A’s seat share at period t (t = 0,1,2,···)
by Xt. Potential voters know that only one voter can obtain the vote in each period,
and a realized seat share is aﬀected by just a new voter’s choice. As a new voter at
t + 1 has a little inﬂuence, she just cares the A’s seat share at t.
We assume that the density function of the potential voters’ preferences is exoge-
nously given. The density function of J is expressed as p(J). A new voter votes for
party A, if her critical seat share is lower than the realized A’s seat share at previous




represented as P(Xt). We denote the number of new seats obtained by party A at





1 with probability P(Xt)
0 with probability 1 − P(Xt).
The number of new A’s seats is a stochastic variable at period t, and A’s seat share
5at period t + 1 is also a stochastic variable at period t. We represent an expected A’s
seat share evaluated at period t as xt+1. The dynamics of xt is given by the relation
xt+1 =
Xt(t + nA + nB) + ξ(Xt)
t + 1 + nA + nB




We deﬁne that ζ(Xt) ≡ ξ(Xt) − P(Xt). The dynamics of expected Xt becomes
xt+1 = Xt +
ζ(Xt) + P(Xt) − Xt
t + 1 + nA + nB
.
Since an expected value of ξ(Xt) is P(Xt),
Eζ(Xt) = E(ξ(Xt)) − P(Xt) = 0.
Then
E(xt+1|Xt) − Xt =
P(Xt) − Xt
t + 1 + nA + nB
.
The dynamics (1) shifts on average at time t ≥ 1 from a point Xt on the value
{P(Xt) − Xt}(t + 1 + nA + nB)−1. Consequently, limit points of the sequence {Xt}
have to belong to the set of zeros of the function P(Xt)− Xt. If P(Xt) is equal to Xt,
A’s seat share keeps Xt from period t on. As shown in Hill et al.(1980) and Dosi et
al.(1994) for an isolated root θ of P(X)−X, one can have convergence of Xt to θ with
positive or zero probability depending on
(P(X) − X)(X − θ) ≤ 0 (2)
or
(P(X) − X)(X − θ) ≥ 0 (3)
in a neighborhood of θ. We call these points stable or unstable, correspondingly.
3 The Stable Seat Share
The dynamics (1) shows that the stable seat share depends on the distribution of
voters’ preferences. That is, the voters’ preferences decide the stable seat share. In
6this section, we analyze an inﬂuence of voters’ preferences on the stable parliamentary
seat share. Voters’ preferences are shown as a distribution of voters’ critical seat shares.
For purposes of comparison we consider two shapes of distribution function, bimodal
and single-peaked.
If most voters support a favorable party strongly, we may have a bimodal distri-
bution. Strong support means voting a favorable party irrelevant to corresponding
party’s seat share. That is, most voters have a critical seat share which is less than
zero or more than one. Because each party has rigid supporters in the bimodal case,
neither party may obtain a monopolistic seat share.
On the other hand, if most voters care the political eﬀectiveness seriously, we may
have a single-peaked distribution. It is reasonable for such voters that vote for a
party having larger power to implement its proposal. In this case, a representative
voterfs critical seat share is around 0.5. As most voters are interested in the political
eﬀectiveness, a party which has larger seat share is more attractive for them and will
obtain higher seat share. It may be easy to occur that a party getting a low seat share
becomes to have a less inﬂuence in the political competition.
Figure 1 and 2 around here.
We quote simple distribution functions as examples to show distinct results; a
symmetric bimodal distribution (N[0,0.3] + N[1,0.3])/2 (see Figure 1), and a normal
distribution N[0.5,0.3] (see Figure 2)2.
Figure 3 and 4 around here









where µ is average and σ is standard deviation.
7(i) If p(J) is (N[0,0.3] + N[1,0.3])/2, we have just one stable seat share 0.5. The
long term co-existence is realized (see Figure 3),
(ii) If p(J) is N[0,0.3], we have two stable seat share. These are represented as
ˆ XL and ˆ XR shown in Figure 4 ( ˆ XL ≈ 0.081 and ˆ XR ≈ 0.918). One party can obtain
much larger seat share than the other does. The lock-in into one of political party is
occurred.
Proof: First, consider the case where p(J) is bimodal. P 0(X) = p(X) > 0 and
P 00(X) = p0(X) is positive if X is less than 0.5 and is negative if X is more than 0.5.
Then P(X) is shown in Figure 3. P(X) − X has one root 0.5. As this root satisﬁes
(2), 0.5 turns out to be stable. In the limit we have the ratio between party A and B
equals to 0.5:0.5.
Next, consider the case where p(J) is single-peaked. P 0(X) = p(X) > 0 and
P 00(X) = p0(X) is negative if X is less than 0.5 and is positive if X is more than
0.5. Then P(X) is shown in Figure 4. P(X) − X has three roots ˆ XL, 0.5 and ˆ XR.
Satisfying (3), the root 0.5 turns out to be unstable, while ˆ XL, and ˆ XR are stable roots.
Consequently, in the limit we can have the situation that the parliament is shared by
party A and B in the proportion either ˆ XL : 1 − ˆ XL or ˆ XR : 1 − ˆ XR. Q.E.D.
If voter’s preferences are distributed as bimodal, each party has strong supporters
who always vote for the support political party. As each party has strong supports
potentially even if it leaves what initial state, in progress of time, a potential situation
is realized and two parliament seat shares become equivalent, i.e., the long term co-
existence is realized in the equilibrium. On the other hand, if the distribution of votersf
preferences is single-peaked, this means that most voters are interested in the likelihood
that a party implements its proposal. As most voters pay attention to the political
eﬀectiveness, a party with a higher seat share is more attractive for voters and it gains
an even higher seat share. After all, a party obtaining a high initial seat share comes
8into power, i.e., the lock-in into one of political party is realized. The past shapes, in
probability, the future, and this eﬀect self-reinforces along the seat share trajectory.
The dominant party is party A, if A has an initial seat share which is more than 0.5,
conversely, it is party B, if A has an initial seat share which is less than 0.5. Early
historical events decide the future.
In Japanese urban area, it is said that entrants have stronger positions than in-
cumbent in electoral competitions. At the beginning entrants may be able to get a
large seat share; however, their seat shares may become smaller gradually. The case
of single-peaked distribution shows that a party with relatively high initial seat share
like 0.49 cannot make its seat share larger. Entrants are attractive enough for voters
to obtain a relatively high seat share in initial, but voters care political eﬀectiveness
much, and incumbentsf established capability to implement policies is more attractive
for voters. Hence, entrants come to have a less seat share.
4 Conclusion and Further Discussion
In this paper, we show that the stochastic choice process may well bifurcate limit
parliament seat share outcomes; lock in and history-dependent selection of a particular
party does occur. Especially we focus on an inﬂuence of voters’ preferences on stable
seat share. Voters pay attention to two points to choose a party; the favor to a party
and the political eﬀectiveness.
If most voters strictly prefer the particular party, voters’ preferences are shown as
the bimodal distribution. As most voters always vote for a favorite party irrespective
of its seat share and each party has the same strong supports, in progress of time, each
party has an equivalent seat share. The long term co-existence is occurred. On the
other hands, if strategic voters have a large share, voters’ preferences are shown as the
single-peaked distribution. Because of the political eﬀectiveness, voters take the seat
share into consideration seriously. A party with a high seat share has an even higher
9seat share. Another party’s power to implement its proposal becomes smaller, and this
party is expelled out of politics in the long-run. The lock-in into one of alternative
political party is occurred. This distribution generates a mechanism for establishing
the dominance of one of the competing parties (and both have positive probability to
dominate). A dominant party is determined by early historical event, i.e. an initial
seat share.
We may apply our results to explain the stability of party system. Previous works
in the literature on the party system have considered that electoral system aﬀects the
stability of party system. Duverger(1967) shows that the single-member district system
works in favor of major parties and encourage the development of two-party system.
Surely in UK and US the single-member district system is used for election and there
exists two-party system. On the other hand, in Canada the single-member district
system is also used like UK and the election system is not changed, but there exists
the ﬂuctuation of party system that the Conservative Party which was the government
party in 1993 had just two seats in the Commons (see Shimotomai and Takahashi
(1996)). This is an example that the single-member district system does not make
two-party system sustainable. Thus, we see that election system has an eﬀect on party
system but it is just one factor to aﬀect the sustainability of party system.
In Britain most of the voters vote for a speciﬁc party because of the social stratum.
We say that Britain in 1950s had a bimodal distribution of voters. Post-war Japan
may have another distribution of voters. Murakami (1982) explains the Japanese voting
behavior; the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the government party and it had
the suﬃcient power to implement own proposal, then many voters support the LDP.
Japanese do not care ‘who’ gives beneﬁts to them, but care ‘how much’ a government
party allocates beneﬁts to them. That is, Japanese voters care about the political
eﬀectiveness rather than the favor to a speciﬁc party. In post-war Japan the distribution
of voters’ preferences may be single-peaked. LDP can establish its political power base
at early time, and then it can become a dominant party.
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